DEUTSCHE OPPOSITION: EXPLANATIONS OF THE GERMAN
OPPOSITION TO THE 2003 IRAQ WAR

By

Mark J. Ferguson

A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of
Mississippi State University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Arts
in Political Science
in the Department of Political Science

Mississippi State University

May 2005
DEUTSCHE OPPOSITION: EXPLANATIONS OF THE GERMAN
OPPOSITION TO THE 2003 IRAQ WAR

By
Mark J. Ferguson

Approved:

Rick Travis
Associate Professor of
Political Science
(Director of Thesis)

Edward Chyn
Graduate Coordinator of the Department of Political Science and
Public Administration

Debbie Davenport
Assistant Professor of
Political Science
(Committee Member)

Hannah E. Britton
Assistant Professor of
Political Science
(Committee Member)

Phil Oldham
Dean of the College of Arts and
Sciences
During 2002 and early 2003 the international debate over Iraq became a major topic throughout the world. The debate became contentious, splitting long standing allies between those who supported the military option against Iraq and those who did not. The United States was at the forefront of the military option movement, while Germany was the leader of the anti-war movement.

In Germany massive protests against the war occurred weekly. Many Germans recalled their own history of war to justify their opposition to any military action against Iraq. To compound the issue even further was the fact Germany in the fall of 2002 was holding national elections and re-election of the ruling government appeared bleak. The ruling parties in Germany tapped into the anti-war movement and in the process used personal attacks against President Bush to win political points. The dispute over Iraq severely strained and tested German and American relations. The intent of this thesis is
to understand the nature of German opposition and to determine if the previously stated explanations fit the case of German opposition.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author expresses his sincere gratitude to the many people without whose selfless assistance this thesis would not have been possible. First of all, sincere thanks are due to Dr. Rick Travis, my committee chairman, for his advice and guidance through this process. My sincere gratitude is also due to the other members of my thesis committee, namely Dr. Hannah Britton and Dr. Debbie Davenport, for their advice and guidance. I would also like to thank my family and friends who have supported me. Without your support this thesis would not have been possible.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS</td>
<td></td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF TABLES</td>
<td></td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF FIGURES</td>
<td></td>
<td>vi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Possible Explanations</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Purpose of Thesis</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. HISTORICAL-CULTURAL EXPLANATION</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German History</td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany Today and the Use of Force</td>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Iraq Conflict and German Involvement 1990-2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical-Cultural Explanation Analysis</td>
<td></td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS</td>
<td></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Level Explanation</td>
<td></td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The German Political System</td>
<td></td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Federal Elections 2002</td>
<td></td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>German Public Opinion and Opposition to the Iraq War 2002-2003</td>
<td></td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Explanation Analysis: Public Opinion</td>
<td></td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political Explanation Analysis: Parties in Power</td>
<td></td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# LIST OF TABLES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Views of Germans</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## LIST OF FIGURES

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FIGURE</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. The Culture of Restraint and Hans Maull’s Civilian Power ID Model</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Growing Opposition to War</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

After many months of military build-up in the Persian Gulf, the United States military began its mission to remove the Iraqi dictatorship from power on March 20, 2003.\(^1\) This build-up and attack came amid months of strong international protests and diplomatic strains between the United States and long-standing allies; one in particular was Germany. Since WWII the United States and Germany were closely tied together (Gardinger and Dale, October 30, 2002). From the end of the war, to reconstruction, the Berlin Air lift, NATO formations, the rise and fall of the Berlin Wall and communism, Germany and Washington had always been close (Gardinger and Dale, October 30, 2002). But relations were strained over Iraq.

I had been living in Germany for nearly three years at that point and had witnessed extreme highs and lows in German-American relations. The positive goodwill that most Germans had had for Americans and the United States in general before and immediately after 9/11 had dramatically deteriorated to an all time low in post-WWII relations. In cities and towns massive anti-war marches and activities were taking place on a daily basis. Many Americans, as a result to the build-up and the war itself, were approached with the question: "Aren’t you ashamed to be an American?" (Expatica, June 2004).\(^2\)
On popular German television stations, ZDF and ARD, there was constant footage of mass protests, not only in the cities of Germany, but across the globe. Criticizing President George W. Bush became the popular past time for German university students at beer parties. Extreme leftist fliers began to spring up all around campuses and towns.\(^3\) Across Germany protests against the war brought hundreds of thousands to participate in such activities. In Munich 35,000 protesters came out on February 8, 2003; and a week later larger protests were organized (Apel, March 7, 2003). On February 15, 2003 an estimated 500,000 people in Berlin protested the possibility of war, while another 250,000 protested throughout Germany (Apel, March 7, 2003).

I was awe struck by this change of attitudes. How it is that Germans can act in such a manner, I frequently thought to myself. Why would the Germans put their faith in the disarmament of Saddam Hussein, a known deceiver who had continuously lied to the world? Why would not the Germans welcome the chance to free a people from a brutal, Fascist regime that was committing human rights abuses and atrocities? After all, Germany had been liberated from a similar fate and had even supported intervening in Kosovo and Afghanistan for similar reasons, violating such long standing “taboos” of using the German military (Expatica, November 30, 2004). They should, by all accounts, be enthusiastic to see the liberation of a people from such cruelties. What has caused this abrupt shift in the attitudes of the German people and government?

**Possible Explanations**

The answers to these questions can be found in several explanations. One explanation is how German history has affected the modern German culture. This
explanation is called the historical-cultural explanation. The historical-cultural explanation is a theoretical explanation that states that the history of a state directly affects the current cultural trends of a state (Heidenheimer, et. al, 1990 p 8). In German post World War II history the historical-cultural explanation has been referred to as ‘the culture of restraint’ (Harrisch, 2004).

German history is a monumental aspect of German life that has a great impact on the modern German psyche. The war left Germany and Europe in ruins. The atrocities that the Nazi regime inflicted upon millions in the name of Germany are a heavy burden that Germans still carry in their psyche nearly 60 years after the death of Adolf Hitler.

It is to this day very difficult for Germans to even say: "Ich bin stolz ein Deutscher zu sein." Germans are very careful not to appear overtly patriotic and have thus worked extremely hard over the past 60 years to erase this image of an evil people who set out to destroy a race and to conquer half of the civilized world. German pacifism, taking the lessons of WWII, has washed away the militaristic traditions of the past (Expatica, November, 2004). This is important because it is harder for Germans to accept the use of force as a legitimate policy. Germans will then look for other policies that will accomplish their goals that would exclude the use of force.

The second explanation is a politically focused explanation. In 2002 Germany was in the midst of federal elections. The SPD candidate, Gerhard Schröder, realizing the degree of public discontent over the war, needed a popular position to prop up his lagging re-election chances and adopted the anti-war stance (Chandler, 2003). This position served to help Schröder’s re-election bid, but it severely strained the close diplomatic ties between Washington and Berlin (Chandler, 2003).
Another politically-based explanation is the composition of the political parties in government. Drawing from this approach, the basic question is would it have mattered if another party was in power? For example if the CDU/CSU, a right of center party in Germany, had been in power during the Iraq conflict, would there have been different policies adopted than what the SPD, the left of center party in power, adopted. The SPD is in a coalition government with the Green Party, further left of center than the SPD, and thus the SPD had to take into account the Greens anti-militaristic history.

A third possible explanation is the international influences. The basic premise of this explanation is to examine whether there were international factors that directly influenced the German policy making process. For instance, was there any direct pressure by foreign powers that forced Germany to adopt their policies? For example did France exert diplomatic pressure on Germany to adopt anti-war policies or is there another possibility?

**Purpose of Thesis**

The purpose of this thesis is to examine possible explanations of German opposition to the Iraq War in 2003, using the historical-cultural, political, and international influences as my vehicles of discovery. The proposed explanations should shed some light on German opposition and should give the reader a reasonable understanding of the multiple causations to German opposition in 2003. After an examination of the possible explanations I will determine their relevance in explaining German opposition. It is entirely possible that, instead of one explanation that fully
explains the German opposition; a combination of explanations may complement each other and give a fuller picture of the events surrounding German opposition in 2003.

My thesis will continue to develop in the following way. In Chapter Two, I will analyze the historical-cultural explanation. In Chapter Three, I will analyze each of the political explanations and in Chapter Four, I will analyze the possibility of international influences on the German policy making process. Afterwards, I will detail German policies after the war in Chapter Five. The purpose of this chapter is to see if there is a continuance of German opposition to the Iraq War after 2003 and what German policies reflect this opposition. Is Germany still opposed to the Iraq war? If so has it continued to adopt policies that are based on any of the explanations put forth in this paper? Have there been any long term effects from the fallout over Iraq?

Finally, this thesis will conclude by reviewing the possible explanations to German opposition in 2003. This thesis will then review their relevance to the central theme of this thesis. Finally, I will suggest possible areas of future research for writers to look into. It is possible that other explanations were in play which are not covered in this thesis.
CHAPTER II

HISTORICAL-CULTURAL EXPLANATION

The historical-cultural explanation is a school of thought that places "special emphasis on the deeply embedded cultural ideas arising from the distinctive historical experiences of nations" (Heidenheimer, et. al, 1990 p 8). This school of thought says that the history of countries does matter and countries can not escape from their history. The history of a country directly affects their society and culture. For instance, Russia is an appropriate example. Their 70 years of Soviet domination continues to affect the modern Russian state, even 14 years after the end of the Soviet Union. This domination has produced toleration among Russians for a very strong, centralized government that places order before democratic values.

German History

Germany has had a very volatile history since its founding in 1871. The defeats in two world wars, the rise and fall of the Nazi regime, the atrocities that regime committed, the Cold War split of Germany, the reunification of Germany, and the difficulties of that reunification all continue to impact Germans today. Most Germans are ashamed of their past but realize that, though Germany is responsible for the atrocities, modern Germany is radically different than the Nazi past.
On the eve of WWI Germany had celebrated over 40 years of unification, improving economic conditions, higher standards of living, and expanded political freedom and stabilization (Orlow p. 70). WWI was an earth-shaking blow to the young country and to Europe. The world was no longer what it was before the start of the war. Germany lost and was punished harshly by the Versailles Treaty, and the Kaiser abdicated his throne (Orlow pp. 72-94). The Treaty of Versailles stripped Germany of lands in the east, forced Germany to pay reparations, to demilitarize land that bordered France, and to accept foreign occupation of German lands (Orlow pp. 105-109). Lives and enormous amounts of resources were spent on both sides at high costs with little return (Orlow pp. 72-94).

Out of the ashes of war and defeat emerged the Weimar Republic. The Weimar Republic was a scene of fluid political situations (Orlow p 105). The Weimar Republic was Germany’s first real attempt at popular democracy and the Republic had powerful enemies from both the right and left (Orlow pp. 101-105). Compounding the situation even further was the worldwide economic depression that hit Germany in 1929 (Orlow pp. 142-145). Attempted revolutions and counter-revolutions by the right and left fringes marked the Weimar Republic’s existence (Orlow pp. 115-122).

This turmoil within the Weimar Republic was the setting for the rise of Hitler and his Nazi party in 1933. Hitler blamed Germany’s defeat and subsequent problems on Jews, Marxists, and democrats who formed the Weimar Republic (Orlow p. 155). Hitler blamed the Jews for the rise of Communism in Russia and Germany’s defeat in WWI (Knox, 1984). To avenge Germany Hitler would “lead” the country and the world in the destruction of the Jews (Knox, 1984).
Ever since Hitler’s emergence in the public sphere, he stated that war was a policy goal to further his revolution of “purifying” the world (Knox, 1984). Hitler was democratically elected Chancellor of Germany in January 1933 and became the unquestioned ruler of Germany after the death of President Paul von Hindenburg (Dill, 1961 p. 350). The Nazis suppressed and prosecuted all political dissidents. Hitler moved to eliminate each of them through mass arrests, purges, and murders; and the SS and the SS were the instruments of terror to eliminate Hitler’s opponents (Knox, 1984, and Orlow pp. 155-156).

Once Hitler’s power base was secure, he turned his sights on Germany’s neighbors to create his Lebensraum or living space, for Germany. To accomplish his goals, Hitler embarked on the rearmament of the German army by rejecting the Versailles Treaty and reoccupying of German lands west of the Rhine River (Knox, 1984, and Orlow pp. 167-174). Hitler pursued an aggressive foreign policy course against Germany’s neighbors. Hitler annexed Austria and the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia and sought to reclaim former German lands in Poland (Knox, 1984, and Orlow pp. 182-186).

On September 1, 1939, under a false pretense of Polish aggression, Hitler ordered the German army to invade Poland (Deutsche Welle, September 29, 2004). On September 3, 1939, Britain and France declared war on Germany (Deutsche Welle, September 29, 2004). From the onset of the war Germany achieved stunning success. Poland, the Low Countries, and France all fell to the German Blitzkrieg tactics; and Britain was pushed back across the channel (Knox, 1984, and Orlow pp. 186-189).
air war over Britain and the invasion of the Union of Soviet Socialists Republic (USSR) brought more devastation to Europe (Knox, 1984).

Hitler then began his Final Solution program to eradicate Jews, Gypsies, Marxists and political opponents (Orlow pp. 190-192). As the German army progressed, the SS death squads went into occupied areas, eliminating or deporting Jews and other undesirables to concentration camps (Knox, 1984). The concentration camps, some already established in Germany before the war, were used to eliminate the Jews and undesirables and forced prisoners into slave labor that would kill many, if the SS guards did not kill them (Dill, 1961 p 370).

Hitler's success would not last indefinitely. Hitler then turned his military machine against the Soviet Union and was forced back at Stalingrad, Moscow, and Leningrad (Orlow pp. 190-192). After the defeats in the east, constant air raids on German cities, and the opening of a second front in France, Nazi Germany was doomed to defeat. The long grind toward total defeat and devastation finally ended with the suicide of Hitler and the occupation of Germany by the United States, United Kingdom, France and the USSR (Orlow p. 192).

Defeated Germany was divided into four occupation zones, each controlled by an occupying power (Orlow pp. 206-208). The German boundary was redrawn in the east as land east of the Oder River was given to Poland, and many Germans were forcibly expelled from their homes (Orlow p. 209). Germany's cities and economy were in shambles and had to be rebuilt (Orlow pp. 209-213). The United States approved the Marshall Plan to help rebuild Western Germany and those parts of Europe not wanting to fall under the domination of the USSR (Orlow p. 217).
The end of the war also saw the rise of mutual distrust between the USSR and the United States. This is more evident with the establishment of two Germanys, both following the ideological lines of their occupiers (Orlow pp. 229-233). In 1949 West Germany was established and followed democratic and free market ideas (Orlow p. 234). East Germany was also founded in 1949 (Kappler and Grevel, 1995 p 32).

In West Germany, parliamentary democratic institutions were reintroduced, and the Grundgesetz, or the Basic Law, was written as a basic constitution (Orlow p 234). The Grundgesetz provided for a parliament, a weak president, chancellor, and a constitutional court (Orlow p. 234).  

After WWII, Germany also developed a "culture of restraint", which is characterized by its anti-war characteristic (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). The culture of restraint directly affected the political culture, opinion, discussion, and foreign policies of Germany (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001).

Hans Maull argues that as Germany was rebuilding after WWII, a civilian power ideology developed (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). This civilian power ideology placed the interests and political power in the hands of the civilian leaders (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). As shown in Table 1, WWII has affected the modern day German mentality. This culture of restraint can adapt to changing international situations, but Baumann and Hellmann, (2001) argue that Germans will remain hesitant and suspicious about using force.
Even though Germany operated under the "culture of restraint", West Germany did not want to remain isolated and silent in international affairs. An example of this is how West Germany engaged itself with the international community. "German post-war foreign policy was based on a series of bargains struck by Germany in order to re-establish itself and insert itself in the international system" (Miskimmon, 2001).

WWII influenced and nurtured "strong pacifist traditions" that are present in Germany (Roxburgh, February 12, 2003). German pacifism first emerged in the west in the 1950s but remained a weak political movement in West Germany (Boutwell, 1983). Pacifism did not matter to the Germans. During the 1950s and 1960s, there were more pressing issues for the West Germans to deal with. For example, the Cold War split of Germany and the possibility of World War III. Another example is the fact that there were different generations in power. That means that the German officials in power were all born before Hitler and grew up with different mindsets about the use of force. It was not until the younger generation, those born after the war, was against the use of the
military and started pressing for change. In the early 1980s the Greens took the forefront of the pacifist movement (Boutwell, 1983, Kappler and Grevel, 1995 p 42).8

East Germany followed the political and economic system established by the USSR (Orlow p. 269). East Germans traded the Gestaop for the VaPo or Volkspolizei,9 a security apparatus that functioned very much like the Gestaop (Orlow p. 274). Political and economic powers were concentrated in the hands of the Communist Party (Orlow p. 269-298). Many East Germans resented the Communist system and demonstrated against the regime or fled to West Germany (Orlow p. 274). To combat the declining population, East German officials erected the Berlin Wall in 1961 and clamped down on border crossings (Orlow p. 280).

By the 1980’s East Germany was falling further behind its western counterpart, causing further social displeasure (Orlow p. 296). By November, 1989, the Communist system had drastically deteriorated, allowing for social unrest and for the opening of the Berlin Wall (Orlow p. 296). On October 3, 1990, East Germany united with West Germany, completing the Federal Republic of Germany (Orlow p. 299).

With the unification of Germany came a renewed sense of public pride and jubilation from German citizens (Orlow p. 299). After 45 years of separation the two Germans were brothers and sisters once more, but soon reality replaced jubilation. The Cold War division had been very devastating to East Germany, and that devastating division continues to affect Germany as a whole today (CNN, November 8, 2004).

Reunification has not fulfilled the high expectations that “it initially promised” (Theodoulou, 2002 p 29). From the onset of unification, the united German government had to deal with troubling issues: housing shortages, high unemployment, the economy
not performing to its potential, labor strikes, high budget deficits, rising crime, protests, and xenophobia (CNN, November 8, 2004, Theodoulou, 2002 p 33, Orlow p. 308-313). To compound the situation further, the German economy was also struggling at this time (EU Business November 8, 2004, der Spiegel, November 8, 2004).

Reunification has proven to be more expensive than first thought (Theodoulou, 2002 p 34). The cost to rebuild East Germany has exceeded $1.5 trillion (CNN November 8, 2004). The differences between east and west can still be seen when one crosses the former border and when one compares wages. In the East unemployment is higher than in the West and there is unequal pay distribution, causing many to seek work in the Western states (CNN, November 8, 2004, Whitlock, November 8, 2004). One-fifth of the citizens in the East are unemployed and over 9 percent in the West (CNN, November 8, 2004). For East Germans the benefits of reunification were too few (Theodoulou, 2002 p 34).

After the fall of the East German regime came a negligible, but noticeable, rise of far right parties (Moulson, September 20, 2004, Deutsche Welle, September 20, 2004). Economic and social turmoil has contributed to the rise of such parties in recent state level elections (Moulson, September 20, 2004). In the September 2004 state elections in Saxony the National Party of Germany (NPD, the successor of the Nazi Party) made significant gains, and the traditional parties, CDU and SPD, suffered major backlashes from the voters (Deutsche Welle, September 9, 2004). In order to meet the challenges of the far right, Germany has moved more left.

The rise of the far right is not the only extreme party that has gained in popularity in the former East Germany. The Party of Democratic Socialism (PDS), the successor
party of the defunct East German Communist Party, has also been able to hold substantial amount of support among voters (Deutsche Welle, September 9, 2004).

**Germany Today and the Use of Force**

The early 1990s witnessed the end of the Cold War system, but Germany was too preoccupied with the integration of the East into the Federal Republic system to be able to fully participate in international affairs (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). The transition from anti-militarism to the willing use of force has been a slow process. Germany has been slowly shedding itself of its aversion to the use of force over the past two decades (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001).

The West German approach to foreign policy focused on multi-lateral approaches to problems, greater European integration, and an anti-militaristic emphasis (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). Any thought of the use of force, prior to Bosnia, would have been political suicide and socially unacceptable (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001).

For decades after the Basic Law, das Grundgesetz, was approved by the West German Bundestag in May 1949 the constitution was strictly interpreted as prohibiting German troops from being sent outside the borders of Germany (Bundesregierung.de and Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). The specific article that was often cited by Germans to prohibit sending German troops outside Germany was Article 115a of the Defense Clause, which only mentions the use of force for self defense (Bundesregierung.de). Nowhere in the constitution did it address the use of force outside the borders of Germany.
With this in mind, it was politically, socially, and historically difficult for Germans to send German troops into combat areas (Hithe, June 10, 2004). Not only was it a problem for Germans themselves, it would also produce uneasiness among Germany’s neighbors, since they were historically the brunt of German military campaigns (Hithe, June 10, 2004). In the 1980s government policy and public opinion began to change, a change which would eventually allow for German participation in military interventions (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001).

The 1991 Gulf War furthered the crumbling of the anti-militaristic barriers of Germany (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). Germany sent no troops to fight in Iraq in 1991 despite international pressure for Germany to contribute more support (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). The Helmut Kohl government had briefly considered sending troops and changing the Basic Law to permit sending German troops abroad (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). Germany was feeling international and domestic pressures. Germany’s allies and some domestic groups wanted Germany to take on “more responsibility” in military intervention (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). Other German domestic groups criticized the move as being another step towards re-militarization (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001).

During the 1990s there was a steady increase in public opinion for German participation in United Nations (UN) approved operations (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). Germany started taking a more active role, beginning with Somalia and Bosnia. Germany sent troops to Somalia on humanitarian grounds and even participated in patrolling in the No-Fly-Zone actions over Bosnia, though with reservations (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001).
Germans on all levels of life were still unsure if taking military action was the proper role for Germans to be playing in international affairs (Baumann and Hellman, 2001). The images of World War II were most definitely present in the decision making (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). Bosnia was also Germany’s first military excursion since the end of World War II. Even though the Germans were and still are there to enforce the peace, there were dangers involved in any military operation that the German government and public had to seriously consider. These dangers included the possibility of a German fighter being targeted and fired upon and a German response would have been to return fire. There was also the danger that German soldiers could be killed or captured, images that no society would want to see of their own soldiers.

The use of force was still a lingering question. The Greens, the SPD and the FDP parties all asked the German Constitutional Court, Bundesverfassungsgericht, to decide if sending German troops abroad was unconstitutional (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). In 1994 the Court ruled that “the Bundeswehr may take part in an out-of-area operation if the Bundestag gives its authorization and if this operation is conducted within the frame work of collective security,” which can include UN or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) approved operations (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001).

The atrocities in Bosnia helped to reinforce the use of force proponents in Germany. This was an opportunity for the supporters of force to point to ethnic cleansing on a scale that had not been seen since WWII and argued that it was the responsibility of Germans, with their own history of such atrocities, to prevent a repeat of crimes against humanity (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). To use military force in Bosnia required a dramatic turn in beliefs by Germans about the fundamental nature of the use of force.
Germany went from the held position that war is never good, a belief reinforced by constant reminders of German atrocities, and opened itself for the possibility for the use of its military (Böschof, June 24, 2004). The German government approved sending troops, both non-combat and combat, to Bosnia to end the atrocities and to support the Dayton Peace Accords (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001).

This change in the way the German nation approached military intervention occurred under the CDU/CSU, a conservative center-right party, led governments (CDU.de). These metamorphisms continued after the SPD Party defeated the CDU/CSU in October, 1998 and formed a coalition with the Green Party. Both coalition parties espoused anti-militaristic attitudes and pacifist leanings, and there was concern from the proponents of force that Germany could revert to anti-force policies (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001, www.cdu.de). Kosovo became the benchmark of attitude changes in Germany.

The upheaval in Kosovo was a pivotal case in modern German history. The use of force in Kosovo marked the first time since WWII that German troops participated in combat operations, and they did so without an UN mandate (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). The Kosovo Campaign was still legal under German law because it was led by NATO, thus it was considered a collective security action. This policy was supported by the SPD/Green Party government, which traditionally led the anti-militaristic movements in Germany (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001).36

All the other major German political parties closed ranks behind the NATO bombing campaign to stop the ethnic cleansing, except for the PDS (Hyde-Price, 2001). The Kosovo Campaign and the active participation of German troops showed that
Germany was no longer handcuffed by its dark past (Hyde-Price, 2001). Germany was finally able, politically and socially, to use force to prevent future crises (Hyde-Price, 2001, Donfried, 2002).

Germany was motivated by three factors to participate in the Kosovo campaign. First, the German government felt a "strong sense of responsibility towards its NATO allies" (Hyde-Price, 2001). Ever since the foundation of Germany after World War II, Germany worked closely with their NATO allies. NATO stood with Germany through the most difficult days of the Cold War, and Germany felt as if it owed a debt of gratitude to their NATO allies. Second, the mass murders played on the unique German historical position, causing a sense of responsibility to end the crimes (Hyde-Price, 2001). This imagery of atrocities was compared to the Nazis and was used by the German government to justify intervention in Kosovo (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001).

Third, Germany wanted to prevent an influx of new refugees and asylum-seekers that would have placed a further burden on the welfare state (Hyde-Price, 2001). Germany has one of the most generous welfare states and asylum laws, which have caused strains on their system. Any sudden influx of refugees from the Balkans could have ended the German welfare state.

Kosovo showed that post WWII Germany had developed far enough to allow for the use of force for "good." The NATO led attacks on Serbia were done without an UN mandate, a point that did not escape those hardcore pacifists who opposed seeing the return of a German militaristic stance (Hyde-Price, 2001). However, those opponents were beginning to lose their power. Most people living in modern Germany had never experienced nor witnessed first hand the horrors caused by Hitler and WWII (Hyde-Price,
2001). The modern generation was raised in a Germany that believed in democratic values, in multilateral approaches and cooperation, and in the welfare state, all of which were missing in the Third Reich (Hyde-Price, 2001).

The next opportunity to use German forces came after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Germany has played a vital role in securing and establishing a peaceful society in Afghanistan by sending 2300 troops to participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan (Overhaus, Maull and Harnisch, 2003).

All through this is an evolution of policies; we can see this progression of use of force policies becoming riskier. The German participation in Bosnia can be characterized as being a safe action. All of the major fighting was over and there was no real danger for German troops. In Kosovo, the situation was more dangerous. German planes were actively flying into hostile territory and attacking Serb positions. There was a great chance that German soldiers could have been captured or killed. And Afghanistan is the ultimate example of risk taking. Afghanistan is an out-of-region situation where terrorist possibilities exist. With each step that the German government took, the risk factor involved also increased.

The 21st century has seen a Germany willing to send troops overseas to combat areas within a specific framework established by the German Constitutional Court and public opinion. Germany has been willing to use its troops for humanitarian missions, an attitude that is very much different from the post-WWII attitude that Germans have had (Deutsche Welle, November 12, 2004). Not only are German troops currently deployed in Afghanistan and the Balkans but also in Djibouti, and they may deploy troops to Sudan.
and in the Mediterranean (Deutsche Welle, November 12, 2004, and CNN, November 17, 2004).

Opposition to the use of force comes mainly from far-left parties, such as the Green Party and the PDS. Most of the German population has sufficiently changed in attitudes about the use of force, while these two parties continue to toto the line of opposition to military usage (The Economist, November 24, 2001). Major sections of the Green Party were in opposition to the Kosovo and Afghanistan Wars, but German participation was approved overwhelmingly by the other major political parties in the Bundestag (The Economists, November 24, 2001). These deployments have come with public approval. For instance, sixty-six percent of all Germans supported sending German troops to Afghanistan (Transatlantic Trends, 2004). A majority of German citizens continue to support participating in Afghanistan. Fifty percent believe that the expansion of the German mission in Afghanistan is just (Backranger Kreiszeitung, December 28, 2003).

An important actor in the German government is Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, of the Green Party. He was one of the earliest members of the Green Party in Germany. His role in the transformation in the German acceptance in the use of force is pivotal. For instance, he exerted enormous amounts of leverage on the Green Party to support both measures to send troops to Kosovo and Afghanistan (The Economist, November 24, 2001 and Crossland, March 19, 2002). Fischer is a man who grew up a leftist radical and “battled” the German government in the 1970s to advance his left leaning views (Grant, April 26, 2004). His attitudes about war have changed along side
those of most Germans, supporting the idea that force can be beneficial (Grant, April 26, 2004).

The Iraq Conflict and German Involvement 1990-2003

When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, it set in motion 13 years of hostilities between the United States and Iraq. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) responded by ordering Iraq out of Kuwait by January 15, 1991, or face war (Yoo, 2003). The war started on January 15 with a massive air campaign, and the ground attack began in February (Yoo, 2003). On April 3, 1991, the UNSC passed Resolution 687 which set the cease fire conditions which demanded the destruction of all weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in Iraq (Yoo, 2003). For the next several years, though, Iraq hindered all weapon inspections, and, by December, 1998, Iraq expelled the weapons inspectors, setting off three days of bombing by the United States and United Kingdom (Yoo, 2003).

As a result of the terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration was determined to solve the Iraq problem (Yoo, 2003). After the one-year anniversary of the attacks President George Bush addressed the United Nations General Assembly, challenging the body to resolve the Iraq threat (Yoo, 2003).

In October, 2002, Congress gave the President the authority to use military force against Iraq (Murphy, April, 2003). By November, 2002, the UNSC passed Resolution 1441 which demanded that Iraq cooperate with the weapons inspectors or face the consequences (Murphy, April, 2003). In December, 2002, Iraq allowed the weapons inspectors to return and submitted a declaration on the status of their WMD programs
(Murphy, April, 2003). Because of these actions, the German government expressed severe concerns about a possible war. Fischer stated that there was not sufficient reason for military action against Iraq (People's Daily Online, September 2, 2002).

After a meeting between the French and the German governments; both declared their opposition to United States military action (BBC News, January 22, 2003). In the declaration both governments wanted more time for the weapons inspectors to complete their search for WMDs, and both governments asserted that any military action needed the approval of the UNSC (BBC News, January 22, 2003). Germany, along with France, sought disarmament through peaceful means (People's Daily Online, March 14, 2003).

Prior to the conference Germany, as a member of the UNSC, had already declared it would not support nor vote for any resolution that would allow military action (BBC News, January 22, 2003). The Green Party had already declared their opposition to any war in Iraq (Deutsche Welle, January 23, 2003). The Green Party saw “alternatives” to military confrontation (Grüne Partei, February 22, 2003).

War should always be a last resort, declared Fischer (Grüne Partei, February 22, 2003). Fischer asserted, “We have from the beginning followed a policy that corresponds to our principles and mandates” (Grüne Partei, February 20, 2003). Though Schröder and the German government were opposed to the war on ideological grounds, the German government did not prevent the United States from using American bases in Germany (Dawn, September 5, 2002).

The CDU heavily criticized the government for their obstinate stance (Deutsche Welle, February 6, 2003). The CDU feared that Schröder Schröder’s opposition to the war before there was any indication of an attack would hurt eventually Germany. If
Germany had chosen the anti-war position and all the major powers had accepted the American position, then Germany risked a "self-imposed isolation...[that]...does not serve Germany's interests" (Deutsche Welle, February 6, 2003). The isolation would have come also in the form of damaged German-American relations. The American government took a similar stance, warning the German government that their opposition was hurting relations (Dawn, September 5, 2002).

**Historical-Cultural Explanation Analysis**

The historical-cultural explanation is the thought that the history of a country matters and that history affects the culture of that country (Heidenheimer, et al., 1990 p 8). Germany is no exception to this. The twentieth century has had an everlasting affect on Germans. The defeat of Germany after WWI allowed for the rise of Hitler, Nazism, and the extreme war mentality of WWII. The atrocities committed by Hitler, a devastating war, and the bitter Cold War split between East and West Germans had dramatically affected the German mentality, more than those events did to any other country (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001). If the Third Reich was the extreme case of militarism running rampant, post-war West Germany was the case of the pendulum shifting to an anti-war extreme position (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001).

But some critics have disputed the historical-cultural explanation to the opposition to the Iraq War. Harrisch (2004) pointed out the inconsistencies by the German government while pursuing the "German way" in dealing with the Iraq question. Harrisch (2004) characterized the "German way" as a "winding road between foreign expectations and domestic considerations." Before taking the Security Council seat in
2003, Joschka Fischer stated that any American action “would be legitimate” even without a second UNSC resolution (Harnisch 2004, p. 3). In February, 2003, the German government supported the European Council Statement on Iraq concerning the use of force to enforce UN resolutions (Harnisch, 2004, p. 3).14

After the war, German officials sought to “mend fences” with the United States and tried to reconcile differences by showing a more flexible position towards Iraq and the American position (Harnisch, 2004, p. 19). The thawing of the ice began when Schröder declared that Germany would help to reconstruct Iraq and supported the American position to lift the UN sanctions on Iraq that had been imposed since the 1990 invasion of Kuwait (Harnisch, 2004). Germany undertook wider operations in Afghanistan, relieving additional strain on the American military (Harnisch, 2004). Germany has also not ruled out a possible peace-keeping role for NATO troops in Iraq and has supplied technical assistance to the Polish contingent being sent to Iraq (Harnisch, 2004).

Critics of the historical-cultural explanation claim that this explanation does not or at least is less valid than it once was. They point to the simple fact that Germany fully participated in Kosovo and Afghanistan. Germany was willing to use force, along with the NATO allies. They put forward the idea that modern Germany is not as strongly affected by its past as it once was (Harnisch, 2004).

But those who discount the effects of the historical-cultural explanation fail to fully explain why a large number of Germans remain fundamentally opposed to war. Even though Germany and the United States have grown closer since the end of the Iraq War, Germany is still historically reluctant to use force. As the following numbers

Summary

German domestic opinion has shifted on the use of force over the past two decades (Baumann and Hellmann, 2001), but it is difficult to argue that the lessons of WWII are negligible in forming German opposition to the Iraq War. The lessons of WWII are reflected in foreign policy formation. Nowhere did a majority of Germans support by-passing international institutions, such as the UN (Transatlantic Trends, 2004 www.gmfus.org). Even Germany’s own security policies have operated under a long standing motto, “Peace created with fewer weapons” (Kappler and Geavel, 1995 p. 202).

The shift in public opinion has not fully ended German uneasiness and views on the use of force. There is a basic divide on the use of war and the perception of benefits of war between the United States and Germany. This occurs because of WWII. For Americans the positive images of a John Wayne “leading his men” in war movies reinforces the basic American belief of the benefits of war. War has been lionized and glorified through cinematic means. In the United States 82 percent would agree that war is sometimes necessary “to obtain justice” (Transatlantic Trends, 2004, www.gmfus.org).
www.gmfus.org). It is commonly held by Americans that Americans fought war of liberations and freed most of Europe and Asia and brought democracy to their defeated enemies.

For Germans, movies about war serve only to remind them of the costs. In the film, *Stalingrad*, all of the main German characters were either severely wounded or killed. Its portrayal of German soldiers dying for a losing cause that was morally bankrupt is an example of how Germans view war. World War II is a significant factor in the formation of attitudes. As a result of World War II, only 31 percent of all Germans agree that war can ensure justice (Transatlantic Trends, 2004. www.gmfus.org). Certainly these attitudes stemming from World War II helped to form German opposition to the Iraq War in 2003.

Germans prefer to influence foreign affairs through its cultural exchange programs, such as the Goethe Institute (Overhaus, Maull, and Harnisch, 2003). The Goethe Institute teaches the host country about German culture, language, and politics (Overhaus, Maull, and Harnisch, 2003). It has been a way for Germany to enter into dialogue with cultures that could prove to be hostile. By establishing friendly, cultural relations with the host culture, Germany is hoping to increase understanding, cooperation, and peace (Overhaus, Maull, and Harnisch, 2003).

The historical-cultural explanation helps to explain German opposition to a point, but it is still inadequate in fully explaining the opposition. If the historical-cultural explanation was the overriding cause of German opposition to war, then the question to participate in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan would have been an easy question to answer. The answer should have been no to participation. But as history has shown that
in recent years Germans are moving away from that position. There should be another explanation that supports German opposition.
CHAPTER III

POLITICAL EXPLANATIONS

The political explanation has two components to it. The first is this idea that political parties are important when policy choices are being considered (Heldheineimer, et. al, 1990 p 8). For instance, it was important that the Republicans were in power and not the Democrats during the tax cut debates in 2001. The Republicans share a basic ideology that lower taxes are good, and both President Bush and the Republican controlled Congress shared this belief. It was easier for President Bush to see his tax cuts approved by the Republicans in Congress instead of a Democratic controlled Congress. Political ideologies do matter.

Germany provides us with another example of how important political parties are when policy decisions are being considered. In the early 1970s, the SPD led Government pursued a policy of Ostpolitik. The German policy of Ostpolitik was a set goal of forming closer ties between West Germany and the Soviet Union and the Soviet Union's satellite countries in the 1970s (Orlow, 1999 p 257). It was important that the SPD was in power, rather than the CDU/CSU. The CDU/CSU was highly critical of the Ostpolitik policy and would not have developed the policy, nor pursued it in the manner that the SPD did.

28
The second political explanation evolves around the core belief that governments are responsive to the public, especially democratic governments. In democracies, the government derives its power directly from the people and "exists to serve the people" (Theodoulou, 2002 p 87). Democratic governments listen to the people through elections and through public opinion. Democratic governments rarely have the option to ignore the people. The two political explanations are important in explaining the German position, but it is public opinion that is given greater importance.

Political Level Explanation

While the historical-cultural explanation is useful in explaining German opposition to the Iraq War, there are other explanations that can be applied as well. The second explanation is the political explanation. There are two different political explanations: party politics and public opinion. Party politics tries to explain what role the political make-up of the government played in the German policy formation on the Iraq issue. For instance, did Schröder have to make political considerations in order to keep his coalition government together and from losing the elections in 2002? Would there have been different decisions made if the government was led by another party? Center left political parties are different than center right parties. Political parties in power do matter and policies are reflective of the political beliefs of the parties in power.

The second political explanation focuses on how public opinion influences policy makers. What role does public opinion play in the decision making process? Are decision makers just reflecting the wishes of the public? These considerations most certainly have affected the political decisions of the German government.
The German Political System

The German political system affects how political decisions are made. Germany is a federal-parliamentary political system (Bundesregierung.de). Germany has an elected chancellor and parliament, but the states, the Länder, share political power and authority with the national government (Bundesregierung.de). Germany has an elected president, who is currently Horst Köhler of the CDU (Bundesregierung.de). Though the German government system provides for a president, it is the Chancellor that holds all political power, while the President holds mostly ceremonial powers (Bundesregierung.de).

Germany has four main parties: the SPD, CDU/CSU, FDP, and the Green Party. The SPD, the Socialist Democratic Party of Germany, is a left-of-center political party that is deeply embedded with labor issues (SPD.de). The SPD was led by Gerhard Schröder in two consecutive national victories in 1998 and 2002 (SPD.de). The SPD is the current senior partner in the German government and has been in power since the 1998 election (Bundeskanzler.de).

The CDU is the largest conservative party in Germany. The CDU is organized in every German state except in Bavaria (CDU.de). In Bavaria the party functions of the CDU is assumed by the CSU (CSU.de). The CDU is led by Angela Merkel (CDU.de). The party was founded after WWII by the first post-war Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer (CDU.de). It was under the leadership of Chancellor Helmut Kohl of the CDU that the
divided Germany was united (CDU.de). The CSU is led by Edmund Stoiber who was the chancellor candidate for the CDU/CSU campaign in 2002 (CSU.de).23

The FDP, the Free Democratic Party, is a party that believes in free market economic policies.24 The FDP has been the traditional junior partner of any CDU/CSU led government in the past, but the party has suffered from recent scandals. The party is currently led by Guido Westerwelle (FDP.de).

The Green Party is an association of environmentalists and pacifists that became a political force in Germany in the late 1970s (Der Weg).25 The Greens were anti-militaristic and very liberal on social issues, such as abortion and immigration (Der Weg). Chors and Moschner, 2002, state that Greens are predisposed to oppose war, regardless of the nature of the war.

The Greens formed a coalition government with the SPD after federal elections in 1998 and again in 2002 (Gruene-fraktion.de). The major actor in the Green Party is Joschka Fischer, the current Foreign Minister (Gruene-fraktion.de). All of these parties democratically compete for political power and the party with the most political support among the voters has the right to form the government. The German government can theoretically be governed by the majority with 50+ of the seats in the Bundestag or in a coalition. Currently Germany is governed by the coalition of the SPD and Green Parties. It is their ideological beliefs that the parties bring to the government and policy formation is often a result of infusion of ideology.
The Federal Elections of 2002

In September 2002 Germany held federal elections. The two main candidates were Gerhard Schröder of the SPD and Edmund Stoiber of the CSU. The 2002 elections were unusually focused on the candidates themselves and their abilities to adapt to national and international crises (Hogwood, 2004). During most German Federal Elections the focus is usually less about the candidates themselves and more on the parties that they represented (Hogwood, 2004).

Schröder had been facing difficulties in getting re-elected. His chances of re-election seemed to be fading with the introduction of each new policy. For instance, Schröder undertook serious economic and social policy reforms that were unpopular (Lawday, April 15, 2004). By all accounts the SPD/Green Party government was heading for defeat in September, 2002. The political situation became so precarious that Schröder started his re-election campaign three weeks earlier than planned (Hogwood, 2004). However, several elements combined to save Schröder and his government from defeat: the Iraq War and flooding in Eastern Germany (Rohrschneider and Fuchs, 2003).

Schröder was able to do two things in the elections. Schröder appealed to the pacifist and national sensibilities of the German electorate as a campaign tactic (Hogwood, 2004). The fear of defeat is a powerful element of democracy that politicians try to avoid and Schröder avoided defeat by adopting the anti-war platform. Schröder was able to tap into the anti-war sentiment for support.

The second action that Schröder did was to recall the difficulties and the near collapse of his government when trying to get approval for the Afghanistan Campaign. In the Bundestag Schröder had to quell a revolt by his junior partner by forcing a vote-on-
confidence (The Economist, November 24, 2001). By forcing the vote-of-no-confidence Schröder forced the hands of the Green Party to agree to any military action (The Economist, November 24, 2001). Schröder realized that the Greens wanted to stay in power and did not want to jeopardize their position in the government. The Afghanistan vote would have future implications for Schröder. It meant that any future consideration on the use of power would be near impossible. Even if Schröder had personally wanted to participate in Iraq, he was politically unwilling to risk another vote of no confidence to force the Green Party to support his policies.

The Iraq situation was used by Schröder to show that war has elements of danger that are often unpredictable and difficult to manage (Hogwood, 2004). Sebastian Hartisch (2004) argues that “domestic political consideration” was the driving force to the opposition. Schröder was willing to steer Germany into isolation rather than participate in a war (Hogwood, 2004). The composition of the coalition government, SPD/Green Parties, is a left of center government with many pacifists that utterly opposed “military interventions in general and early military action against Iraq” (Hartisch, 2004). Schröder used the negative “collective memory” of war specifically for his political advantage (Richter, January 30, 2003).

This theme appealed to left-leaning voters who opposed military intervention (Hogwood, 2004). But Schröder’s election theme had a wider nationalist appeal. It showed a willingness of greater German assertiveness and autonomy in international affairs (Hogwood, 2004). Schröder’s stance “often won (him) a standing ovation on the campaign trail,” but Schröder’s campaign rhetoric caused diplomatic tensions between Germany and the Bush Administration (Hogwood, 2004). This was the start of the
political rift between the German and American governments that severely strained relations. The more popular Schröder's position became the more that Schröder was willing to severely criticize the Bush Administration. Bilateral relations were going through their own mini-Cold War.

The Iraq War was one political fortune for Schröder to exploit. The second would come just weeks before the elections. In the late summer of 2004 Eastern Germany experienced severe flooding, devastating Dresden and cities along the Elbe River (Wickens, 2002 and Hogwood, 2004). Schröder quickly realized the political value of the floods and reaped the benefits of appearing to be pro-active during the crisis (Donfried, 2002). Schröder appeared in the flood ravaged areas “to demonstrate his concern” to the flood victims (Hogwood, 2004).

The immediate response of Schröder and the government helped improve Schröder’s re-election chances (Chandler, 2003). Schröder was able to redirect government funds to aid the victims of the floods (Hogwood, 2004). Schröder’s handling of the floods gave him a boost in the opinion polls (Hogwood, 2004). The floods helped to improve the government’s appearance of being a “decisive crisis manager” (Chandler, 2003). Schröder may have won the elections by focusing only on the Iraq issue if the floods had never happened, but his chances of doing so would have been fewer. Schröder’s timely and professional response won Schröder critical votes in a very critical election. If the floods did not occur the CDU/CSU may have won the elections and different policies may have been followed, especially a less antagonistic approach.

The 2002 elections are a perfect example of the German public willing to place their national economic problems aside and give their support to Schröder’s anti-war
candidacy, even though he did not fulfill his promise to improve the economy. In fact under Schröder’s the German economy continued to deteriorate. The election strategy of Stoiber was to focus on the economic situation (Rohrschneider and Fuchs, 2003). When Schröder first came into power in 1998, he stated that his economic policies would be the test for him to pass (Rohrschneider and Wolf, 2003). If the voters decided that Schröder deserved to be re-elected, the economic situation would have to be improved (Rohrschneider and Wolf, 2003).

During the four years that it was in power, the SPD/Green government was unable to improve the economic situation (Rohrschneider and Wolf, 2003). Germans were “skeptical” over the future prospects of the German economy and a majority of citizens believed that “economic conditions would probably deteriorate” (Rohrschneider and Fuchs, 2003, Rohrschneider and Wolf, 2003).

The CDU/CSU was successful, although only “partially,” in raising the economic question as a campaign issue (Rohrschneider and Fuchs, 2003). The CDU/CSU pursued a policy of reducing taxes (Hogwood, 2004). The CDU/CSU believed that by reducing taxes the economy would ignite economic growth in Germany (Hogwood, 2004). Unemployment became a critical campaign target of the CDU/CSU and the party squarely used Schröder’s own 1998 campaign speech against him (Hogwood, 2004).

Stoiber was betting that the collective memory of Schröder’s own statements on the economy would come back to haunt Schröder. And Stoiber was fully prepared to focus just on the economic situation in Germany and not prepared on other issues. His unpreparedness to adequately respond to the Iraq issue was his own undoing and he foolishly expected a static campaign season where no other issues would creep into the
campaign. Stoiber was simply not paying attention to international affairs, nor what the German public was feeling about the Iraq issue. And when it came time for Stoiber to respond to the Iraq issue and even to the floods he appeared to have no plan to sufficiently ease the fears of the German voters and to convince them to vote for him. This lack of planning and foresight made Stoiber appear to be “unchancellor-like”.

Stoiber’s response to the Iraq situation was initially less combative or hostile towards the United States. Stoiber was critical of “Schröder’s refusal to involve Germany in United States action against Iraq” (Hogwood, 2004). But in late August Stoiber reversed course and blasted the United States for any move that was unilateral and did not involve an UNSC mandate (Hogwood, 2004). Stoiber’s apparent “flip-flop” on the issue that had been clearly claimed by the Schröder campaign gave the appearance of incompetence in international affairs (Hogwood, 2004).

Stoiber handling of the flooding crisis was mismanaged at best. Stoiber committed a mistake that no politician could afford. He first appeared in the flood ravaged areas a week after the events (Hogwood, 2004). Stoiber’s late appearance made him appear less sympathetic to the needs of the people and he could “never (fully) regain the confidence to the public” (Hogwood, 2004). Stoiber also had the misfortune of not being in the government. Stoiber was unable to redirect government funds to the East (Hogwood, 2004). Stoiber’s strategy was too little, too late.

In the end the Iraq situation and the floods allowed Schröder to divert attention away from economic problems that Stoiber so desperately wanted to exposed (Hogwood, 2004). The international situation and the floods placed attention on the economy on the back burner of the voters’ minds (Maier and Rattlinger, 2004). The Iraq War and the
floods was the bit of political luck that any struggling politician would pray for and Schröder capitalized.

The election was very close. The SPD and CDU/CSU each amassed 38.5 percent of the vote (Maier and Rätlinger, 2004), but the SPD defeated the CDU/CSU by a little more than 6,900 more votes (Roth, 2003). Stoiber had the clear advantage in the public perception of who could solve Germany’s economic woes (Roth, 2003). But Schröder won where it truly mattered. “Schröder had a clear lead in regard to (his) personal and political leadership qualities” over Stoiber and the August floods and the Iraq crisis served only to bolster this image (Roth, 2003).

The Iraq War overshadowed any real gains Edmund Stoiber was able to make by using the economic situation as a campaign strategy (Donfried, 2002 and Chandler, 2003). The SPD and Green parties were successfully able to refocus the German public’s attention from the domestic, economic problems to Iraq (Chandler, 2003, Rohrschneider and Fuchs, 2003). Stoiber was forced to respond to the Iraq question “hesitantly and awkwardly” forcing him to appear weak on international affairs to the German public (Chandler, 2003).

Schröder’s “overt hostility” to the war helped him politically at home, but it alienated him from Washington (Chandler, 2003). Some Bush Administrators characterized the American-German relationship as being “poisoned” (Donfried, 2002). Schröder even went so far as to exclude the use of German troops in Iraq even under a UN mandate (Rohrschneider and Fuchs, 2003).

The Iraq war helped to mobilize Schröder’s political base, a base that was in doubt over the candidate’s policies (Chandler, 2003). Germans, who “under ‘normal’
circumstances would never have supported Chancellor Schröder, are doing so now” (Apel, March 7, 2003). Schröder took the anti-war position and refused to help in the coming war and by doing so was able to tap into the growing anti-war sentiment (Chandler, 2003). It mattered that the SPD and the Greens remained in power. The voters realized that the SPD and Green Parties were in the best position of keeping Germany out of an undesired war. The SPD and the Greens had the credentials among the voters of being truly anti-war and not just saying things to appease the voters as Stoiber appeared to be doing. By doing so the voters rewarded Schröder with a new four year term.

The Greens were able to motivate and mobilize their pacifist base (Chandler, 2003), thus winning 8.6 percent of the vote compared to the FDP with 7.4 percent of the vote (Maier and Rättinger, 2004). The success of the Greens was not only a direct result of the Iraq crisis, but also the popularity of Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister (Rohrschneider and Wolf, 2003).

After the election the opposition to the war continued to be a benefit for the SPD and to Schröder personally. After the start of war the SPD gained three percentage points, and Schröder’s personal popularity surpassed that of Angela Merkel, his possible rival for the next federal elections (der Stern, March 23, 2003).29 Germans were decidedly against the war: 81 percent indicated that they were against the war, while only 14 percent said the war was justified (der Stern, March 23, 2003). Germans were also overwhelmingly pessimistic about the prospects of a democratic Iraq. Seventy-four percent believed that a democracy could not be established in Iraq, compared to 19 percent who believed otherwise (der Stern, March 23, 2003).
Because the SPD and the Green Parties remained in power they would adopt anti-war policies and work to prevent war. Germans were relieved that lead weapons inspector, Hans Blix, never gave the crucial evidence of Iraq’s inspection interventions the United States needed to justify the war, despite the heavy criticism of Iraq’s cooperation on three occasions, December 19, 2002, and January 9 and 27, 2003, (Murphy, April 2003). Germany, France, and Russia declared their intentions of seeking a peaceful resolution to the Iraqi crisis and sought more time for the inspectors to complete their job (Murphy, April, 2003, Gerz, February 14, 2003, and Gerz, February 28, 2003).

The Bush Administration aggressively tried to prove to the international community that Iraq was in violation of its obligations. The United States called for the UNSC to hear its case against Iraq. Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the UNSC and gave details of continuous violations of Resolution 1441 by Iraq (Murphy, April, 2003). The attempts by the Bush Administration failed to convince its critics of the validity of their case (Deutsche Welle, February 6, 2003). Chancellor Schröder remained adamant that the question of intervention in Iraq should remain within the UNSC and no military action was warranted, following his political beliefs about the use of force (Gerz, January 3, 2003).

In mid-February, 2003 the United States and United Kingdom sought diplomatic support from the UNSC but ended all diplomatic efforts by March 18 of the same year at which time President Bush gave Saddam Hussein 48 hours to leave Iraq. The Iraq War began on March 20.\textsuperscript{30} By April 9 Baghdad had fallen to Coalition forces (Murphy, April,
On May 1, 2003, President Bush declared an end of all "major combat operations" in Iraq (Yoo, 2003).

**German Public Opinion and Opposition to the Iraq War 2002 - 2003**

Public opinion is different because of the fundamental relationship in policy decisions. In party politics, it is assumed that the relationship between ideology, decisions making and public acceptance of the decision(s) is linear. However, in public opinion the relationship is different because it is the public's support for or against policies that drive the policy making process of governments, regardless of political ideology.

Before the war began and ended, public opinion throughout Germany and Europe remained decidedly against the war. The military build-up and the Iraq War divided Europe into two camps or as the Secretary of Defense called it: Old Europe vs. New Europe (The Economist, September 25, 2004). Europe was divided on the governmental level, but on the civilian/individual level a super majority of all Europeans were united against the war (The Economist, September 25, 2004). The questions of how to secure peace, how to end terrorism, and when to use military strength sharply divided Europe and the United States (Sennott, September 9, 2004).

In Spain, a supporter of the United States war in Iraq, 96 percent of Spaniards disagreed with the Spanish government’s position to support military action, while 73 percent of all Germans supported their government’s position to oppose military action (The Economist, September 25, 2004 and Schulz, Emsnid Poll, January 17, 2003). Also 72 percent agreed with government policy to reject any request to send German troops to
Iraq (Schulz, Emnid January 17, 2003) and a majority of Germans believe that the Iraq War was wrong (der Backnanger Kreiszeitung, December 12, 2003). Though the war divided European governments and their citizens and strained relations with the United States, a majority of Europeans want to have the United States as a friend, rather than as a rival (The Economist, September 25, 2004). Table Two is a compilation of the previous poll numbers and demonstrates that as war became more inevitable opposition increased.

![Graph showing growing opposition to war](image)

**Figure 2:** Growing Opposition to War

Sources:
- der Backnanger Kreiszeitung, December 12, 2003
- Thomas Schulz, Emnid Poll, January 17, 2003
- Thomas Schulz, Emnid Poll, February 21, 2003
- Der Stern, March 23, 2003

In the Capital of Berlin 69 percent of the citizens were against the war (Anker and Hartmann, February 10, 2003). In the formerly divided city 52 percent of West Berliners have a positive opinion of the United States (Anker and Hartmann, February 10, 2003).
Fifty-six percent of East Berliners had a negative view of the United States (Anker and Hartmann, February 10, 2003). Fifty-four percent of Berliners under age 30 have a negative attitude against the United States (Anker and Hartmann, February 10, 2003).

Major religious leaders voiced their opposition to the war, such as the leader of the Catholic Church in Germany, Karl Cardinal Lehmann (Gerz, January 31, 2003). The Lutheran Church, under the leadership of Bishop Walter Klaiber, joined with the Catholic Church calling the war unjustified (Deutsche Welle, March 25, 2003).

Some politicians were very hostile to the Iraq War. Criticism, directed towards the Bush Administration, continued to grow heavier during the buildup of troops. Herta Dübeler-Gimelin, the German minister for justice, compared President Bush and his motives with that of Hitler’s aggressive motives that led to war (Gardinger and Dale, October 30, 2002, and Hogwood, 2004). This tirade caused Dübeler-Gimelin to lose her post in the government (Hogwood, 2004).  

The foreign ministers of France, Germany, and Russia met in Paris to discuss how to approach the upcoming war in March, 2003 (Gerz, March 7, 2003). The governments of the three countries reiterated their opposition to any UNSC resolution that would allow for war in Iraq, and they felt that the weapon inspectors needed more time to complete their work (Gerz, March 7, 2003).

As it became clear that war was becoming more likely, opposition to the war was increasing. By February 2003, opposition to the war grew to 83 percent, while supporters to the war fell to 13 percent (Schulz, Emnid Poll, February 21, 2003). According to der Stern 81 percent believed that the war was unjustified, while only 20 percent believed that the United States wanted a peaceful and democratic Iraq (der Stern, March 23, 2003).
A majority, 64 percent, even rejected war as a last resort (Schulz, Emnid Poll, February 21, 2003).21

A majority of Germans, 57 percent, believed that the United States is a “nation of warmongers,” but 6 percent believed that President Bush wanted peace (Horsley, BBC News, February 11, 2003, and Financial Times Deutschland, February 9, 2003). German opposition continued to remain high in Berlin and throughout Germany (Anker and Hartmann, February 10, 2003, and Kölner Bildungs Server, February 9, 2003). Table Three shows the views of Germans as it relates to the Iraq War and perceptions of the US.

TABLE 1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Views of Germans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Reject war as last resort</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against troops in Iraq</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US as warmongers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>War to obtain justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US wants peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources:
Thomas Schulz, Emnid Poll, January 17, 2003
Thomas Schulz, Emnid Poll, February 21, 2003
der Stern, March 23, 2003
Transatlantic Trends, 2004
Schröder's Iraq policy was inconsistent and incoherent at times. One could claim that Schröder's government had several conflicting policies, even up to the proceeding months up to the war (Harnisch, 2004). In early 2002 Schröder indicated German support for military action against Iraq (Harnisch, 2004). It was only after the election campaign started that Schröder truly adopted the anti-war stance (Chandler, 2003 and Hogwood, 2004).

But in December 2002 Fischer indicated that any American action would be legitimate even without an UNSC Resolution (Harnisch, 2004). Schröder's later opposition to the war was greatly influenced by the public sentiment against the war and his political desire to "(preserve) the red-green government in the face of considerable opposition within the coalition government" (Harnisch, 2004). These polls all show that there was massive opposition against the Iraq War. Given the massive force of public opinion, it is likely that the German government was bending to the will of the people and that public opinion was dictating the policy choice outcome.

On the day the war began, March 20, 2003, the SPD gained 3 points in public opinion polls (der Stern, March 23, 2003). However, the SPD still remains unpopular and had only 32 percent support (der Stern, March 23, 2003). The anti-war stance helped to improve the political standing of the SPD, but the affects could be temporary (der Stern, March 23, 2003). The opposition leader, Angela Merkel, continued to lead Schröder in possible chancellor match ups since the elections in 2002 (der Stern, March 23, 2003). Public opinion is never stagnant and is constantly revising itself. If the situation in Iraq stabilizes even further, public opinion against the war may not play as big of a role in the next elections and Schröder could face defeat.
Political Explanations Analysis: Public Opinion

The historical-cultural explanation helps to explain why Germany was against the Iraq War. It, however, does not fully explain why the German government was opposed to the war. The political explanations complement the historical-cultural explanation and in unison with the historical-cultural explanation can more fully explain the German opposition. The political make-up of the government and public opinion are two variables that can not be overlooked. Public opinion was the driving force for German opposition to the war; and politicians had to heed seriously the movement, regardless of how they might have felt about the war (Asmus, Everts and Isenmög, 2004).

According to Harnisch (2004) if the lessons of WWII, the historical-cultural causes, had been the overriding reason, German governmental leaders should have rejected from the outset any consideration of the use of force. The pacifist faction of the coalition government was strong enough to have caused Schröder to call for a vote of no confidence when the German government wanted to participate in Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan (Harnisch, 2004). Harnisch appears to accept the position that parties and public opinion matter as they apply to the German opposition and down plays the importance of the historical-cultural explanation. One can conclude that, with high public opposition to the war and the near catastrophic vote on Operation Enduring Freedom, submitting the proposal to participate in the Iraq war to the Bundestag would have been politically destabilizing and too risky for Schröder, even if he wanted to participate in Iraq.
The only natural course for Schröder to follow was a course to stabilize his coalition, and this could be accomplished by opposing the Iraq war. Going into the election Schröder’s government was trailing behind in the polls (Harnisch, 2004). During the campaign Schröder made the election about participating in the Iraq war and took the widely popular position of opposition to the war, in part to shore up his base (Harnisch, 2004). The Iraq issue and the popularity to the opposition thereof forced the CDU/CSU candidate, Edmund Stoiber, to move his Iraq position closer to that of the Schröder’s (Harnisch, 2004).

Before, during, and after the elections, the left-of-center government had opposed any Iraq conflict (Harnisch, 2004). Harnisch (2004) argues that publicly opposing any military action for any reason had only served to limit the scope of effective German diplomacy. Schröder stated that Germany would not “approve a second resolution that legitimizes war” (Harnisch, 2004, p. 15). The German government pressed for more time for the weapon inspectors in Iraq, a position that the United States clearly rejected (Harnisch, 2004). The German government inhibited itself in approving any action even if Iraq had been found possessing WMDs, thus being forced to follow the policy regardless of the outcome.

**Political Explanations Analysis: Parties in Power**

The central idea of a party government explanation is that political parties, with all of their various ideologies, do matter. The elections of 2002 certainly played a role in the decision making process of the German government. Schröder was lagging behind the polls and appeared headed for certain defeat (Rohrsneider and Fuchs, 2003 and
Chandler, 2003). Two things helped Schröder to win. First, the floods in Dresden were instrumental in turning the tide in favor of Schröder. Public opinion started turning in his favor and Schröder began to close the gap between him and Stoiber (Rohrschnieder and Fuchs, 2003 and Chandler, 2003).

If the CDU/CSU had won the elections I would expect very different policies approaches from them. This idea is supported by a German diplomat with whom I had the pleasure of interviewing (Ferguson, 2005). The CDU/CSU would have had four different policy choices to choose from. First the CDU/CSU government could have supported the American position on Iraq by giving political support. This could include sending troops, money to finance the war and/or using its influence to advocate for going to war. The second possibility would have the CDU/CSU rejecting any war in Iraq and following the exact policy choices and rhetoric that the SPD/Greens followed in the lead up to war. The second possibility would have all the negatives consequences and political fall-out that Germany and the United States experienced.

Third the CDU/CSU, after reacting to the immense public opinion, could have abstained from supporting without causing a major rift. Germany could have used its abstention right as a member of the UNSC. An abstention is fundamentally different from voting no. It is a softer way of disagreeing with a policy without saying no. A fourth policy choice that the CDU/CSU could have followed would have been this policy of respectfully declining participation, but this policy would not have been as vocal or as interventionists as the SPD/Greens were. It is more likely that the CDU/CSU would have followed a combination of options three and four. The CDU/CSU would have abstained in the UNSC and decline participating in Iraq, without the harsh rhetoric. The CDU/CSU
would have kept a low profile and bilateral relations between the United States and Germany would not have suffered serious strains.

Another factor relating to the party government explanation is the political decisions made by the SPD in conjunction with the Greens. The Greens were united in opposition against the Iraq War, which they were not able to demonstrate during the Afghanistan debates in 2001 (Harmsch, 2004). The Greens presented a united front and could not be convinced to change their stance on Iraq. If Schröder wanted to politically survive, he would have to adopt the anti-war position or risk losing the elections or being dumped as chancellor.

Summary

The political explanation states that public opinion and political considerations were important factors when the German government was forming policies on Iraq. Together with the historical-cultural explanation a clearer picture of German opposition begins to emerge. When one looks at the following numbers one sees that German opposition does not entirely depend on the historical-cultural explanation. Eighty percent of Germans support the SPD/Green Party’s position of not sending German troops to Iraq (Transatlantic Trends, 2004. www.gmfus.org). In the case that an UN mandate in Iraq was passed, fifty-seven percent of Germans would have supported sending German troops to Iraq (Transatlantic Trends, 2004. www.gmfus.org). With these numbers indicating military support, one has to reconsider the historical-cultural explanation. These numbers indicate that Germans were not overwhelmingly hesitant to send troops to
Iraq. It is important for Germans to continue to work within a multilateral framework, and with the approval of the UNSC Germany would be doing just that.

When President Bush announced his Iraq policy, Schröder seized the moment to espouse the anti-war voice (Rohrschnieder and Fuehs, 2003 and Chandler, 2003). His policies, though at times contradictory, reflected that of public opinion that was so decidedly against the war. Without public opinion against the war, Schröder may have gone down in defeat. The affects of public opinion can also be seen in how Stoiber changed his Iraq position. Stoiber heavily criticized Schröder for alienating Germany from the United States. But the public opinion eventually forced Stoiber to adopt the anti-war position (Hogwood, 2004).

There was not just one explanation that can fully clarify why Germany was against the war, such as the historical-cultural explanation, but two explanations. The political explanations and the historical-cultural explanation work to explain the German opposition in 2003. Since two explanations can be used in conjunction with one another, do the international influences help to explain German opposition? After all, there are differences between the United States and Germany that may have played a role.
CHAPTER IV

INTERNATIONAL EXPLANATION

The fourth explanation used in this thesis is a school of thought of international power politics. The international influences state that stronger states use their power to force weaker states to adopt or change policies (Ode, 1982 p. 30). It is the thought that power in the international system matters and weaker states are powerless to resist the influences of powerful states. For instance, the Soviet Union used its overwhelming power to force Eastern Europe to accept communism and to fall in line with the wishes of the Soviet Union. And when a state deviated from the Soviet Union’s predetermined policy choices, weaker states often suffered the consequences. This calls into mind the experiences of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Each tried to follow a more independent path and they were brutally suppressed by the Soviet military.

Chapter One, I posed the question: Were there any international influences that directly influenced German foreign policy? For example, did France, per se, use diplomatic pressure against Berlin to get its way diplomatically? The answer to this question appears to be no. It appears that there was no outside influence on Germany. There is at least no public evidence supporting this.

The reason is that the German government had already indicated the direction of their foreign policy, while France was still undecided. In fact it was Germany that was
the leader in international opinion on Iraq. It is quite possible that France was workingbehind the scenes, directing Germany in their policy choices, but that begs the question—why? Why would France force Germany to come out against the war first and not simplyvoice their opposition openly? What was France to gain by pursuing this policy choice?To shield France or lessen the affects the anti-French sentiments in the United States? Orwas France trying not to publicly alienate both the United States and Germany? Itappears that France was unsuccessful in both cases. France did incur the animosity ofAmericans and did alienate the American government, while moving closer to Germany.

The reason why international influences are examined is the historical tendency ofGermany following the United States and France in foreign affairs since 1945. Germanywas closely aligned with the foreign policies of the United States and France and whenGermany opposed the United States and led France on the Iraq issue, this is somethingcompletely new. This could be a change in how Germany approaches internationalaffairs or it could be a one time thing.

International Influences

International influences are abundant in international affairs. Odell, 1982 presents theinternational thesis as stronger states exerting pressure on weaker states for policy changes. Policy choices of weaker states are a function of the situation that the weaker state exists in (Odell, 1982 p30). If a weak state exists in a “rough neighborhood” it will most certainly comply with the wishes of the stronger states for survival.

How does this explanation apply to Germany in the run up to the Iraq War? In the case of the Iraq War we, according to this school of thought, should be able to detect
some outside influence on German policy choices. Germany would have pursued its policy path because it forced to by a stronger state. The United Kingdom and France are the only two Western European powers that could have had the possibility of exerting so much power on Germany to force policy changes. We can quickly exclude the United Kingdom since the government was a strong supporter of the Iraq War.

France is the only major power that has borders with Germany. Germany has been trying to prove that it is a "good European" and has often followed France in policy decisions (Welsh, 2004 p 235). France has a history of leading Germany in international affairs and France did come out against the war, along with Germany and Russia and sought a peaceful resolution to the Iraq Issue (Murphy, April, 2003, Gerz, February 14, 2003, Gerz, February 28, 2003, and Gerz, March 7, 2003).

Since France declared its opposition to the Iraq War, did Germany follow France? An examination of the timeline indicates that it was France that was following Germany. Germany had already declared it opposition to the Iraq War months ahead of France (Chandler, 2003 and Hogwood, 2004). It was the central theme of Schröder's re-election bid in September 2002 (Chandler, 2003 and Hogwood, 2004). It is possible that France was working quietly behind the scenes against the war, but there is no evidence available to support this assertion. Neither the French nor the German governments have released documents that clearly point to France as the international influence on German policy on Iraq.

France, for reasons that belong in discussions in another paper on this topic, was not the driving force behind European opposition to the Iraq War, but rather Germany was. Germany declared its opposition before France officially took a position known.
Maybe the French from the beginning opposed the Iraq War and kept their decision a closely guarded decision, but there is no evidence to support this claim. We simply are unable to know if this is true at this point in time. This claim is better investigated in another paper.

**International Explanation Analysis**

The international influences concept is the idea that stronger states compel weaker states to adopt policy choices (Odell, 1982 p 30). But there is no evidence that can claim that Germany was reacting to the pressure of a more powerful state. The only powerful states that were in any position to influence Germany were divided on the Iraq issue, and the one that supported Germany’s Iraq position had done so after Germany had declared it position (Chandler, 2003 and Hogwood, 2004). This school of thought seems not to apply in this case because it was Germany that was the leader of the anti-war movement.

**Summary**

The international influences have many flaws as it applies to Germany and the Iraq War. Either the German government was forced by France to adopt an anti-war position or there was something else involved. The possibility of outside influence is difficult to prove, which I quickly debunk. There is, to this day, no public evidence of outside influence by another country on German foreign policy. Germany was one of the first to declare its position on Iraq and France followed Germany in early 2003.
As far as I can determine there were no international influences that swayed Germany. Germany had already made its decision before most countries made a decision (Chandler, 2003 and Hogwood, 2004). France was not a major factor in leading Germany to make its decision on Iraq. Since Germany was in the forefront of the anti-war movement any outside influence explanation is rejected. I first put forth the theory of a country putting undue diplomatic pressure on Germany. This theory does not seem hold. Looking at the states available that have the power to force Germany to adopt an anti-war stance, they can all be excluded.

The most obvious state that could have forced Germany to adopt this policy would be the United States. The power of the United States is vastly superior to that of Germany’s power and we know that the American government wanted German support for the Iraq War. Germany’s response was to reject the American position. The United Kingdom is another possibility, but it can quickly be discounted as a possibility, since the British government supported the United States. Neither the United States nor Britain would actively work against their own policies. France, Russia, and China, hypothetically, all have the capability to force policy changes upon Germany, but in each case they declared their policy stances well after Germany (Chandler, 2003 and Hogwood, 2004). As far as I can tell there was no public diplomatic pressure on Germany to oppose the war.
CHAPTER V

GERMAN POLICIES AFTER THE WAR

Pre-war relations between the United States and Germany suffered its own mini-Cold War. Now let us look at the post-war Iraq policies and American and German policies after the war. The purpose of this section is to examine the policies of Germany and the United States and how they are applied to Iraq. This chapter is to examine, first, if there is any continuation of German opposition to Iraq and, second, if the relationship between Germany and the United States is still in a mini-Cold War atmosphere.

After the Iraq War began Germany had two foreign policy choices that they could have adopted. First German foreign policy could remain opposed to helping the new Iraqi government and the United States. Second, Germany could seek reconciliation with the United States. If so what policies have been adopted? Has there been any long term negative affects in American/German relations?

The End of the Mini-Cold War

The war and President Bush are two very popular topics to criticize in Europe. This fact is evident in that a vast majority of Europeans and all across the globe were hoping for a Kerry victory (Walt, September 27, 2004). The presidential election was a
hopeful chance for change. A Kerry win would have signified a possibility for changes in American foreign policy. However, since Bush was re-elected, one wonders where does Germany go from here? Germany could continue to pursue an adversarial role or pursue a course of cooperation and reconciliation with the Bush administration.

After the American elections on November 2, 2004, Gerhard Schröder was one of the first international leaders to call President Bush to congratulate him for the victory (Expatica, November, 2004, and RP Online, November 3, 2004). Schröder expressed hopes that the United States and Germany will “renew cooperation” between the two countries (Expatica, November, 2004). Global “challenges” could be solved only with the cooperation of both states, commented Schröder and the Foreign Minister, Joschka Fischer (Expatica, November, 2004, RP Online, November 3, 2004, and Webb, November 4, 2004). Germany has also been supportive of the new Iraqi government. Schröder was one of the first world leaders that congratulated the Iraqis on the transfer of power from the United States back to the Iraqi people (Expatica, June 28, 2004 and Gerz, June 28, 2004).

However, the period prior to the war and the outbreak of war had placed a wedge between the Bush Administration and the German government; Germany and the United States have since worked to mend the differences between the two countries (Expatica, November, 2004). The German government seems willing to adopt certain post-war Iraq policies that go against their previously stated anti-war positions. Various German ministers have also stated that it is in the best interests of Germany and the world to ensure the stability of Iraq (Expatica, November, 2004 and Burns, November 05, 2004). This, along with the comments about the possibility of German troops participating in
Iraq by Defense Minister Peter Struck, shows a thawing of the mini-Cold War relationship that existed between the two administrations.41

Despite the differences about the war, Germany and the United States have worked to mend the differences between the two countries (Expatica, November, 2004 and Knowlton, June 11, 2004). Germany has been interested in seeing a free, peaceful, democratic, and sovereign Iraq. Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer’s speech to the International Conference on Iraq, held in Sharm-el-Sheikh, Egypt, enumerates how Germany is participating in the reconstruction of Iraq (Auswärtiges Amt, November 23, 2004). Germany has participated providing military training, but also humanitarian, cultural, and economic help to the struggling nation.42

Germany has extended a “helping hand” to President Bush by training Iraqi police and soldiers in the United Arab Emirates (Deutsche Welle, October 14, 2004, McLean, November 9, 2004, Deutsche Welle, November 16, 2004, der Spiegel, June 24, 2004 and Werkhouser, November 16, 2004). German police have also trained their Iraqi counterparts, and 32 army experts have trained the Iraq army in the “use of heavy military trucks” (Das Auswärtige Amt, June 21, 2004 and Deutsche Welle, November 16, 2004). And Germany has offered the use of German bases to train the Iraqi military (Deutsche Welle, October 13, 2004).

In a sign of improving German-American relations, Germany has also pledged 193 million Euros for humanitarian aid and emergencies and offered to help to rebuild Iraq at the Madrid Conference on Iraqi Debt Relief (Gierz, October 27, 2003 and Fras, November 24, 2004). Fischer has called on Iraq’s neighbors to participate more fully in the stabilization of Iraq (Expatica, June 21, 2004).
Germany has also supported an American plan to reduce the Iraqi debt by 80 percent, which some estimate to be $120 billion and the debt that Iraq owes Germany stands at $2.4 billion (John and Møller, November 6, 2004, Deutsche Welle, November 16, 2004, Georges-Picot, November 21, 2004, Deutsche Welle, November 22, 2004 and Vesely, 2004). The planned debt relief would be accomplished in various stages. Thirty percent would be immediately written off (Georges-Picot, November 21, 2004). An additional 30 percent will be written off later, with the remaining 20 percent forgiven if the debt relief program is successful (Georges-Picot, November 21, 2004).33

Despite improving relations with the United States, there are still some Iraqi policies that Germany is reluctant to pursue. Germany still opposes sending NATO troops to aid the Coalition in Iraq (Gerz, May 28, 2004 and Kessler, December 10, 2004). Germany, along with France, has continued to reject the use of NATO forces for any combat role in Iraq (John and Møller, November 6, 2004). The two nations, however, have agreed on sending small training missions to help train Iraqi forces, but no German troops will be serving in Iraq, although indications by Struck suggested some future role for German troops (John and Møller, November 6, 2004, Werkhäuser, November 16, 2004, and Die Tageszeitung, October 14, 2004). This public break in positions was severely criticized by the junior governing partner, the Greens, and by SPD party members (Die Tageszeitung, October 14, 2004).

Though the German government had declared its opposition to sending any troops to Iraq, there was for a moment the appearance that the German government might have completely reversed its policy course. Defense Minister Struck had previously stated that German troops may be sent to Iraq in some form in the future (Deutsche Welle, October
13, 2004, and Deutsche Welle, October 14, 2004). Struck praised Kerry’s international conference proposal (Deutsche Welle, October 13, 2004). Struck’s comments set off a firestorm of criticism from members of the SPD and The Green Party (Deutsche Welle, October 13, 2004). This appeared to be a public change in policy, which was quickly denied by Joschka Fischer, the foreign minister (Deutsche Welle, October 14, 2004).

Even though the defense minister appeared to soften Germany’s stance against participating in Iraq, Chancellor Schröder continued to oppose any German troops being sent to Iraq (Deutsche Welle, October 14, 2004). The current policy will not be altered.

Foreign Minister Fischer reiterated Germany’s position that NATO should not be used to help secure Iraq (GeZ, May 28, 2004). Although Germany is opposed to sending NATO troops to Iraq, Germany wants to help train Iraqi troops, but not in Iraq itself (Deutsche Welle, July 12, 2004, and Deutsche Welle, July 29, 2004).

The Bush Administration has accepted the German position that no German soldier will be sent to Iraq in the foreseeable future (Der Spiegel, November 7, 2004). However, the United States is looking for other avenues of support from Germany (Der Spiegel, November 7, 2004).

Summary

After having reviewed these post-war events it is instructional to return to our theoretical explanations and consider these events through their perspective. It is quite clear that German policies have moved closer to a cooperative stance with the United States, rather than a confrontational stance. Yet the historical-cultural explanation is still at play in German foreign policies. There is still a cultural resistance to war that is
important consider. It helps to explain why Germany is still refusing to send troops to Iraq, even under NATO. Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan may have been exceptions to the rule, rather than rethinking of the use of force by Germans.

The first component of the political-explanation was focused on the federal elections in 2002. Schröder won a second term and is shielded to a point from public backlash. Schröder does not have to worry about immediate problems like being voted out of office. Schröder has time to formulate a response to any challenges. This is a possible explanation as to why German foreign policy is less hostile to participation in Iraq. The participation in Iraq, granted, is not even in Iraq and on a limited scale, but Germany is still participating.

Now that the election is over, Schroeder can afford to be “nice to President Bush,” but it must be remembered that the rejection of sending German troops is still a function of the historical-cultural explanation. But Schröder still has to take into account his junior partner, the Greens. If he were to move openly to send troops to Iraq, it is quite possible that the Green Party could bolt from the government in protest, jeopardizing Schröder’s government, leaving him only three alternatives: to rescind the proposal, resign his position, or to form a Grand Alliance with the CDU/CSU. It is this prospect that Schröder most likely wants to avoid.

The political explanations can be useful in understanding the German opposition to the Iraq War. Also, it does matter that the SPD and the Greens are still in power. They followed a policy course that resembles their political ideologies. The CDU/CSU would have followed their ideologies in forming policies, which could have been
dramatically different from that of the current German government. The CDU/CSU might have been more willing to participate more in rebuilding Iraq.

The second component of the political explanation is public opinion. German public opinion was instrumental in influencing the policy making process. The SPD/Greens were reacting to public sentiment against the war. Public opinion even forced Stoiber to turn 180 degrees on Iraq and caused him to come out against the Iraq War. Neither Schröder nor Stoiber were willing to go against such immense public sentiment against the war. It can be noted that the German government was and still is responsive to the people as a function of democracy. Public opinion is still against the war and the German government is restrained from participating more in Iraq.

The international influences do not fit at all in this case. First there was no outside influence on German foreign policy during the Iraq War build-up. Germany declared its position before the rest of the major powers had done so. The international influences state that a weaker power is forced to follow the policies of a stronger state. Since Germany had declared its intentions it seems reasonable to claim that the other major powers were following the lead of Germany. There is no evidence that Germany was being influenced by some other powerful state. Germany was leading the way in the anti-war movement, not following orders of another state.
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

This thesis has examined several possible explanations for German opposition to the Iraq War. Schröder has also worked in “shedding” Germany’s pacifist abroad (Kim, April 1, 1999). Germany has undertaken more military responsibilities since 1990 and Kosovo and Afghanistan are prime examples of how far the German mentality has progressed since 1945 (Kim, April 1, 1999). It is hard to argue that history is still overwhelmingly burdening the German conscience from using force again.

The historical-cultural explanation certainly played and continues to play a role in influencing German foreign policy. But as time passes the historical-cultural explanation seems to weaken in the face of recent historical incidents. The Germany of today is culturally different than the Germany of pre-WWII era. Most Germans, though realizing the significance of their past, feel that they have changed and should not be held accountable for the crimes of the past. It is this transition in attitudes that has allowed for the slow transition in attitudes in military intervention.

Many say that Germany is reluctant to use force. But as Kosovo and Afghanistan have shown, Germany is not as reluctant to use force as one might think. In retrospect, when the government of Germany rejected military intervention in Iraq, the German
government was not only reacting to its history and to the demands of its citizenship, but also Germany was exercising its sovereign right to pick and choose its policies. The German government exerted its right, as any government does, to choose when to militarily intervene, for example Kosovo and Afghanistan, and when to stay out, Iraq.

Germany is just like any nation that exists on Earth. Germany can pick and choose which foreign policy "adventures" to pursue, which is normal for a nation to do. Germany may have been one of the first to say no to participation in Iraq, but it was not the only country to do so. Many European, Asian, African and Latin American countries also exercised their sovereign right to choose which Iraq policy to follow. Germany behaved like an independent and sovereign country and rejected outside influence on their foreign policy choices.

It is not to say that the historical-cultural explanation can not be used to explain German reluctance to use force. Indeed, this explanation certainly was the driving force behind German foreign policy since WWII. And, although the history of Germany is still significant, it has dissipated to the point that force, in the German psyche, can be used to prevent atrocities, not just for political gains and killing people. Even before the Iraq War the impact of history on Germany was lessening. Germany was participating in international hot spots such as Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan.

It is entirely possible that the lessons of WWII have made the Germans more responsible when the question of force arises. Further, the public’s attitudes about protecting vital interests resemble that of the United States. A large portion of German citizens, 42 percent, agree that it justifies "to bypass the UN when the vital interests of their country are at stake" (Transatlantic Trends, 2004 www.gmfus.org).
I have determined that the historical-cultural school of thought did play a role in German opposition to the Iraq War, but it does not fully explain why. This explanation needed another possibility, and I included the possibility of the political explanations. The first political explanation is that "parties matter." It is important that the SPD/Green Parties were in power and not the CDU/CSU. The policies followed by Germany are a reflection of the ideologies of the parties in power. The second political explanation is that public opinion also matters. With a vast majority of Germans against the war it would have been very difficult for any German party to ignore this sentiment. Certainly, Stoiber of the CSU even changed his position to reflect German public opinion.

The last explanation, the international influences, does not fit well when explaining German opposition. There is no evidence that Germany was being influenced by some other powerful state. Germany was leading the way in the anti-war movement, not following orders of another state. The historical way that Germany has participated in the international system does not fit this case. How Germany led international opinion may be a new era of Germany leading international opinion or the Iraq War may be a one time thing. We do not know as of yet if this is a turn for Germany.

Other Possibilities of Research

The explanations put forth in this thesis are only a few of the possible explanations can be used to explain the German opposition to the Iraq War in 2002-2003. There are several areas of inquiry that researchers can study to see if they can help explain German opposition to the Iraq War. One might examine if there were economic reasons for Germany's opposition. With the unfolding UN Oil-for-Food scandal, it
would be interesting to determine if money played a role in the decision making
process of the German government.

Another topic for future research could be to examine my international influences
even further and more precisely, the ideological differences between Bush and Germans
as a whole. With Bush and most Germans possessing fundamentally different ideologies
that the German government did not want to cooperate with the Bush Administration.
Maybe with the passage of time things will be clearer for researchers to determine if there
is any relationship. I would expect the answer to that question to be no.

The last possible area of research could be to examine for long term diplomatic
consequences for Germany. It is possible that as this thesis is being written that it is still
too early to determine the full range of diplomatic, or for that matter, social fall out
between the United States and Germany. It might take several years to fully determine
the lasting effects of the strained relations between the United States and Germany
caused by the Iraq War. My sense is that since there have been attempts by the German
government to move closer to the United States that the effects of opposition to the Iraq
War will be at a minimum and there will be no long term diplomatic tensions between the
two countries.
END NOTES

1 Because of the time differences the war started in Iraq on March 20, while in the US the date was still the 19th of March.
2 Though, while in Germany I had not personally experienced the targeting of Americans for the policies of the Bush Administration, I have known of people who were.
3 I personally witness several fliers criticizing US foreign policy on the campus of the University of Trier and in Stuttgart. These fliers, as far as I was able to tell, were done by independent students, who were exercising their rights of free speech, and not coerced in any way by government officials.
4 This translates to be "I am proud to be a German."
5 The Saarland and the Rhineland Palatinate were demilitarized and occupied by the terms of the Versailles Treaty.
6 The false pretext was a ruse created by Hitler to create a valid excuse to attack Poland (Deutsche Welle, September 1, 2004). SS soldiers, disguised as Polish soldiers, attacked a German town close to the then German-Polish border (Deutsche Welle, September 1, 2004).
7 The original intent of das Grundgesetz was that of a post-war transition constitution before a permanent constitution would be written after re-unification (Hauck/Adlon, 2002: p. 33).
8 Schmidt lost a vote of no confidence and was forced out of the government.
9 The People’s Police.
10 The German government requested that the US government seek an UN mandate, but was rejected by the Clinton Administration (Baumull and Hellmann, 2001). The Clinton Administration held the position that the UN was "incapable" of passing any resolution on Kosovo (Baumull and Hellmann, 2001).
11 The cry "Nie wieder!" was often said to prevent the abuses from their Nazi past.
12 The US Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, called the French and German "Old Europe" and regardless of their opposition and interference there were many more European allies that "supported the US" (BBC News, January 22, 2003 and BBC News, January 23, 2003).
13 The Greens believed that war would destabilize the Middle East, the UN could be an effective tool in forming global rules, legitimacy, and institutions, and obvious low public support for the war gave them the political cover needed to oppose their coalition partners, if needed (Leonard, August 11, 2002).
14 The European Council Statement on Iraq stated that any "US military action may be necessary as a last resort to enforce UN" resolutions (Hanisch, 2004, p. 3).
15 Only 44 percent of EU citizens agreed with the premise that international organizations, such as the UN, should be bypassed when the "vital interests of their country" are at risk (Transatlantic Trends, 2004. www.gmuav.org).
16 "Freiden schaffen mit wenger Waffens"
17 Germany is comprised of 16 states (Bundesregierung.de).
18 The German President is elected to serve 5 year terms (Bundesregierung.de).
19 Since February 2004 the SPD is led by Franz Müntefering (SPD.de).
20 Christlich Demokratische Union (CDU.de).
21 Christlich-soziale Union in Bayern e.V (CSU.de).
22 Sollner also leads the Bavarian state government (CSU.de).
23 Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP.de).
24 The official name of the German Green Party is Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, reflecting the union of the West and East German Green parties (Harth, 1997).
No one is able to predict the future with total certainty and all the claims by the pro-war advocates may have proven false and detrimental to the rest of the world.

I was traveling by train from Trier to Stuttgart on election day. At 6 P.M. that night the train crew had announced that Stooler had won. An hour later at the station where I was being checked to see that the results were overturned and that the election was too close to declare a victor and that a victor might not be announced until late that night.

Many in the SPD were indignant as to whether Schröder should continue to be the chancellor (Der Standard, 2003).

According to the results of the opinion poll from the Forsa-Institut and in conjunction with der Stern and RTL, a German TV network, the SPD was from 29 percent to 32 percent support, while the CDU/CSU fell from 48 percent to 45 percent support (Der Stern, March 23, 2003). The poll was conducted between March 17 and March 21, 2003, and polled 1094 German citizens (Der Stern, March 23, 2003). The statistical error is +/-2 percent (Der Stern, March 23, 2003).

The war began on March 19, 2003 US time.

Old Europe is a reference to the Western European states that were the original members of the EU and represented the opposition to the war, while New Europe is a reference to East European states that were future members of the EU and the future of Europe and they supported the United States.

Dührkoop-Gemlein lost her job because her comments were inappropriate of government official to make and the American government strenuously protested to the German government and Schröder did not want to have multiple diplomatic disputes to diffuse between the United States and Germany.

Though the SPD enjoyed wide support for its Iraq policy, the SPD continued to trail the CDU/CSU (Schötz, Emnid Poll, February 21, 2003). The SPD received 28 percent, compared to the CDU/CSU which received 48 percent in the poll (Schaal, Emnid Poll, February 21, 2003).

Schröder led his reluctant government to participate in the military action against the Taliban (Harnisch, 2004). It would have most certainly been impossible for Schröder to get any resolution passed by his government in support of US military action.

The statement was made on January 31, 2003, while campaigning for the SPD in Lower Saxony (Harnisch, 2004).

Germany was joined by France and Russia in seeking a peaceful solution to disarming Iraq (Harnisch, 2004).

Because of the nature of this diplomat's work and the need to appear impartial, the name of the diplomat will be withheld to protect this source from appearing to be or construed to be partisan. Any inquiries into the identity of this source will be considered on a case by case basis. This diplomat told the opinion that certainly the CDU/CSU would have approached Iraq differently. The answer might have been still no, but the response by the German government would not have been as conducive toward the United States.

If the election had been held in Germany alone, 74 percent of all Germans would have voted for Kerry, while only 10 percent would have voted for Bush (Walt, September 27, 2004).

Schröder listed four challenges that the world should face: international terrorism, regional crises, poverty, and environmental changes (RP Online, November 3, 2004).

Innenminister (Minister of the Interior) Otto Schily is attributed to stating that "(despite the issue of our differing positions in the past, we all have a contribution to make in securing that the situation in Iraq stabilizes."

Interalminister Peter Struck had commented that in the future German troops may be sent to help Iraq in some form (Die Tageszeitung, October 14, 2004). The comment was intended to help Kerry with the Presidential Election. This was a signal of the softening of the German position.

Fischer asked the world not to allow bitter and violence to win and stated that it is the burden of world community to secure success in Iraq (Aussendienst Amt, November 23, 2004).

The total amount of Iraqi debt owed to Germany and the G8 will be reduced from $38.9 billion (EUR 29.9 billion) to $7.8 billion (EUR 6.0 billion) (Deutsche Welle, November 22, 2004).
REFERENCES


Bundesregierung.de. “Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Gesetze/4224/Grundgesetz.htm>


CSU.de. “Parteistruktur.” <http://www.csu.de/home/display/Parteistruktur>


Ferguson, Mark J. Private Interviews with a German Diplomat at Mississippi State University. February 16-18, 2005.


2003_01_17.html>

2003_02_21.html>


A5182/6B085256E77009D32F7?OpenDocument&start=1&Count=30&Expand
=1>


